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Georgia's Geopolitical PositionQuarterly article · Q3 2026

Drift, not pivot

Between July and September 2026, Georgia's government dismantled its opposition, lost its last European patron and discovered that Russia would still squeeze it.

September 30, 2026 · 6 min read

The short version

The third quarter of 2026 made Georgian Dream's strategy legible. The party was not pivoting to Russia, nor to China, nor to the West. It was buying time: avoiding any move that might provoke Moscow, keeping enough Western contact to preserve leverage, and deepening ties with Beijing and Tehran where they cost nothing.

By the end of September, the costs were mounting anyway. The government had moved to ban every major opposition party, lost its principal European ally when Hungary's government changed, watched Russia keep applying pressure, and been ordered by a US court to pay $350 million for an abandoned hydropower project.123 The one relationship that grew, with China, remained economically thin.

The Anaklia exit

The quarter's defining economic decision came on 6 July, when China formally walked away from the Anaklia deep-sea port. CCCC and China Harbour Investment had held 49% since 2024; their exit formalised months of speculation. The government responded with a "landlord" model: the state retains the core infrastructure and brings in international partners in limited roles.4

Belgian contractor Jan De Nul kept dredging. A second vessel arrived in September and the breakwater base was completed, while the first phase stayed on a 2029 target.45 The model lowers dependence on any single power, but it also leaves the project without a strategic anchor. China's departure removed the flagship of the June "comprehensive strategic partnership" before the partnership was three months old.6

The Asian alternative, tested

Georgian Dream spent the summer building an Asian alternative. Kobakhidze toured Central Asia, signed partnership agreements with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and made the first official visits to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.7

The economic story was thinner. The government announced that exports to China rose 177% in January-August and that China became the top FDI source in the first half at $236 million.8 But Chinese FDI had fallen to $29 million in 2024, China accounted for only 4.6% of total FDI in the first quarter of 2026, and it was not among Georgia's top five export markets.9 The partnership was useful as a domestic political signal, less so as an economic strategy.

The one-party turn

The domestic project advanced faster than the foreign one. In September, Georgian Dream added For Georgia, the only opposition party still in parliament, to a Constitutional Court lawsuit seeking to ban all four major opposition parties.1

The pressure extended beyond party politics. UNM leader Giorgi Baramidze was detained on treason and sabotage charges over remarks about prisoner exchanges in the 1990s Abkhaz war.10 Eight opposition leaders faced sabotage charges carrying up to 15 years.11 The government also cut $2.4 million in funding for Harvard's Georgian Studies programme.12

Former US Ambassador Ian Kelly and the Bush Institute's David Kramer warned in July that a banned opposition, no political outlet and a captured court raised the risk of unrest and possible Russian intervention.11 The lawsuit itself made the trajectory explicit.

The Russian squeeze

Moscow did not reward the accommodation. In August, Georgia declined to join the EU's updated sanctions on Iran, while every other candidate country signed on.13 Russia's response was not warmer relations but continued pressure.

In August, Medvedev marked the anniversary of Russia's recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by calling it "geopolitical justice" and comparing Saakashvili to Zelenskyy.14 Russian state media seized on Kobakhidze's praise for the 1783 Treaty of Georgievsk to claim that Tbilisi was reassessing its history.15 A leaked report revealed a ₽13 billion programme to influence Russian-speaking communities through the Orthodox Church and cultural groups.16

South Ossetia showed the same pattern. Marat Kambolov, a former Russian official installed in May, won a snap presidential election in September with 85% of the vote.17 Putin congratulated him; the EU called it a step toward annexation.17 Tskhinvali had already said it was not ready for a transit route with Georgia.18

The Western relationship

Washington kept the channel open without restoring the relationship. Trump sent a personal letter in August.19 Kobakhidze met the new US chargé, Amy Diaz, and later spoke with Trump and Rubio at the UN General Assembly.2021 A CBRN response exercise in Batumi showed that working-level security cooperation continues.22

But the trust deficit was visible in policy. The US made its visa bond permanent for Georgian applicants, at up to $20,000, the only European country covered.23 The White House named Georgia in China's tariff-circumvention network.24 The post in Tbilisi was filled by a chargé, not an ambassador.20

Europe's position weakened too. The EU's enlargement vision in August named Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine and Moldova as frontrunners and did not mention Georgia.25 Then Hungary's new government expelled ten Russian diplomats and moved toward mainstream European positions; Jamestown called it the loss of Georgian Dream's last institutional patron in Brussels.2

What the quarter settled

Three things became clear. Georgian Dream will accept economic and diplomatic costs to preserve its domestic position. Russia will keep applying pressure regardless of Georgian concessions. And the West has neither the leverage nor, increasingly, the appetite to reverse the drift.

The quarter ended with Georgia more isolated, more dependent on a China that invests little, and no closer to the security it says it needs.

What to watch

  • Will the Constitutional Court grant the ban, and what does the opposition do if it does?
  • Does Russia's trade pressure produce a Georgian concession, or only more pressure?
  • Can the Anaklia landlord model attract a strategic investor before the 2029 target slips?
  • Does the EU move from rhetoric to measures, or leave the accession file frozen?
  • Does China convert its trade and investment numbers into anything durable?

References

Footnotes

  1. OC Media, "Georgian Dream now wants all major opposition parties banned", 2026-09-15. https://oc-media.org/georgian-dream-now-wants-all-major-opposition-parties-banned/ ↩ ↩2

  2. Jamestown, "Hungary Shifts West Under Magyar", 2026-09-23. https://jamestown.org/hungary-shifts-west-under-magyar ↩ ↩2

  3. JAMnews, "US court orders Georgia to pay $350m over halted Namakhvani HPP", 2026-09-17. https://jam-news.net/georgia-to-pay-350m-over-namakhvani-hpp/ ↩

  4. Eurasianet, "China quietly exits Georgian port deal", 2026-07-06. https://eurasianet.org/china-quietly-exits-georgian-port-deal ↩ ↩2

  5. OC Media, "Second dredging vessel reaches Anaklia as work on port moves forward", 2026-09-02. https://oc-media.org/second-dredging-vessel-reaches-anaklia-as-work-on-port-moves-forward/ ↩

  6. The Diplomat, "Georgia's Upgraded Partnership With China", 2026-06. https://thediplomat.com/2026/06/georgias-upgraded-partnership-with-china-a-louder-signal-an-empty-promise ↩

  7. JAMnews, "Georgia's Asian Pivot — What Does Tbilisi Seek in Central Asia?", 2026-07-21. https://jam-news.net/georgias-asian-pivot ↩

  8. Civil.ge, "Kobakhidze Lauds Growing Economic Ties With China, Talks About Exploring New Markets", 2026-10-07. https://civil.ge/archives/753810 ↩

  9. ChinaObservers, "Georgia's China Pivot — An Illusion of Alternatives?", 2026-09-30. https://chinaobservers.eu/georgias-china-pivot-an-illusion-of-alternatives ↩

  10. Caucasus Watch, "UNM Leader Giorgi Baramidze Detained Over Abkhaz War POW Remarks", 2026-09-14. https://caucasuswatch.de/en/news/unm-leader-giorgi-baramidze-detained-over-abkhaz-war-pow-remarks.html ↩

  11. Just Security, "The U.S. and the EU Must Wake Up to Threats in Georgia", 2026-07-29. https://www.justsecurity.org/149941-u-s-eu-threats-in-georgia ↩ ↩2

  12. OC Media, "Georgian government scraps funding for Harvard's Georgian Studies Programme", 2026-08-20. https://oc-media.org/georgian-government-scraps-funding-for-harvards-georgian-studies-programme ↩

  13. JAMnews, "Georgia does not join EU's updated sanctions against Iran", 2026-08-17. https://jam-news.net/georgia-does-not-join-eus-updated-sanctions-against-iran/ ↩

  14. Caucasus Watch, "Medvedev Frames Russia's 2008 Recognition of Abkhazia, South Ossetia as 'Geopolitical Justice'", 2026-08-26. https://caucasuswatch.de/en/news/medvedev-frames-russias-2008-recognition-of-abkhazia-south-ossetia-as-geopolitical-justice.html ↩

  15. JAMnews, "'Occupation is off' — Russian state media RIA Novosti on Georgian PM Kobakhidze's remarks", 2026-08-24. https://jam-news.net/occupation-is-off-russian-state-media-ria-novosti-on-georgian-pm-kobakhidzes-remarks/ ↩

  16. OC Media, "Leaked Russian report details diaspora influence strategy", 2026-07. https://oc-media.org/leaked-russian-report-details-influence-strategy-for-diaspora-in-south-caucasus ↩

  17. OC Media, "Former Russian official Kambolov wins South Ossetia presidential election", 2026-09-19. https://oc-media.org/former-russian-official-kambolov-wins-south-ossetia-presidential-election ↩ ↩2

  18. Caucasus Watch, "Tskhinvali Not Ready for Transit Route With Georgia", 2026-09-14. https://caucasuswatch.de/en/news/tskhinvali-not-ready-for-transit-route-with-georgia.html ↩

  19. AsiaNews, "Trump Opens to the Georgian Dream", 2026-08. https://www.asianews.it/en/caucasus/georgia/trump-s-opens-to-the-georgian-dream ↩

  20. Georgia Today, "Kobakhidze signals readiness to restore US strategic partnership in meeting with Diaz", 2026-08-26. https://georgiatoday.ge/kobakhidze-signals-readiness-to-restore-strategic-partnership-from-a-clean-slate-at-meeting-with-us-charge-daffaires-diaz/ ↩ ↩2

  21. Caucasus Watch, "Kobakhidze Raises US Strategic Partnership With Trump, Rubio", 2026-09-28. https://caucasuswatch.de/en/news/kobakhidze-raises-us-strategic-partnership-with-trump-rubio.html ↩

  22. Caucasus Watch, "Georgia, US Agencies Conduct CBRN Threat Response Exercise", 2026-09. https://caucasuswatch.de/en/news/georgia-us-agencies-conduct-cbrn-threat-response-exercise.html ↩

  23. Caucasus Watch, "U.S. Makes Visa Bond Requirement Permanent for Georgian Applicants", 2026-08-03. https://caucasuswatch.de/en/news/us-makes-visa-bond-requirement-permanent-for-georgian-applicants.html ↩

  24. JAMnews, "White House: China is using Georgia to circumvent US tariffs", 2026-08-18. https://jam-news.net/white-house-china-is-using-georgia-to-circumvent-us-tariffs/ ↩

  25. Georgia Today, "EU enlargement commissioner outlines reform vision, again makes no mention of Georgia", 2026-08-26. https://georgiatoday.ge/eu-enlargement-commissioner-outlines-reform-vision-again-makes-no-mention-of-georgia/ ↩

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